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New Multi-Objective Techniques in Physical Planning 
•'•• Intro duet ion 
Multiple objective decision problems tend to be omnipresent. In many real-
world decisions a wide variety of conflicting points of view can be observed. 
A conflict emerges' as soon as the emphasis on one obj ective hampers the attainment 
of a good result of another objective. The solution of decision problems. with 
conflicting objectives is a difficult task for many decision-makers, especially 
when the problem involves a considerable number of objectives, instruments and 
restrictions, which gives rise to uncertainty about the set of feasible alter-
natives and the effects of decisions. 
For some decision-making bodies, such as entrepreneurs and governements, 
analysts may be able to produce the relevant information on which a .reasonable 
decision can be based. Thus, from the point of view of . availability of 
information about priorities and possibilities, we may distinguish two parties: 
1. the decision-maker (DM); 
he is frequently uncertain about a.) his own priorities and b.) the feasible 
..alternatives and their effects; 
2. the analyst; 
het is normally uncertain about the DM's priorities, but he has relevant 
information about feasible alternatives and their effects. 
The central question to be dealt with in this paper is: which relevant 
information has to be produced by the analyst to enable the DM to make an adequate 
decision? The information processing should comply with 2 criteria: (.1) the 
amount and quality of information should be sufficiënt to provide a surveyable 
picture of the alternatives and their effects, and (2) the amount of information 
should be limited, because the DM's information digesting capacity is limited. Thus 
the amount of information should be neither too. large, nor too small. 
In the following sections several methods are presented to produce the type 
of information which may meet these requirements. In section 2 some concepts 
of compromise decisions are discussed. These concepts can be used to generate a 
fairly limited number of alternatives providing a rather complete picture of the set 
of alternatives (section 3). 
In section 4 we discuss the possibility that the DM and the analyst become 
engaged in a structured communicative process in which the analyst presents piece-
wise information about alternatives in exchange for the DM's information about some 
of his priorities. Thus, an interactive process may emerge, resulting in the 
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deter-mination of the most desired alternative. Section 5 is devoted to an inter-
active method which resuits in a whole range of potential desirable alternatives, 
rather than only one such alternative. This is especially useful when the 
decision-making body consists of multiple persons each striving only for a very 
limited number of objectives. Section 6 is devoted to some numerical examples 
for a physical planning problem focussing on the problem of finding locations for 
households when the objectives are the minimization of the private and environ-
mental costs of mobility. 
2. Conflicts and Compromises among Objectives 
Decision problems may be more or less well-defined. In this study we will 
concentrate on relatively well-defined problems, which means that information 
is assumed to be available about two important elements in decision problems, 
viz. on Instruments and objectives as well as on the impacts of instruments on 
objectives. Thus, we assume: 
- the DM has at his disposal I instruments: _x = (x..,... ,x')' 
- the vector of instruments x is an element of a convex set K, being a subset of 
E 1 (x € K C R 1 ) 
- the DM considers J objectives: u> = (ÜJ, ,... ,ÜJ_) ' which he wants to. maxiraize. 
- for each combination of instruments x_, the effects on the set of objectives u can 
be determined with certainty. Hence, a set of J concave objective functions 
u_ = (u1,...Jüi )' is assumed to exist, each mapping x_ € iR to u. € SR . 
Note that one piece of information has not been mentioned, viz. the DM's 
priorities among objectives. Consequently the analyst has insufficiënt information 
to be able to generate an "optimal" solution. Especially for large values of J and I 
the DM will be unable to survey the set of alternatives without analyticai assistance. 
We may conclude therefore that the four assumptions mentioned above entail the 
situation of information (un-)availability for DM and analyst, described in section 1. 
Which relevant information can be produced by the analyst to the 
DM? In section 2 and 3 we discuss three successive concepts: 
(a) a set of J extreme alternatives, each reflecting the exclusive importance of 
only one objective; 
(b) one-compromise solution, which tries to achieve the best levels for J objectives 
simultaneously; 
(e) a set of J "half-compromises", each reflecting a compromise between the simul-
taneous maximization of objectives as in (b) and the maximization of single 
objectives as in (a). 
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In fig. 1 the three types of alternatives have been illustrated for the case 
that I = J = 2.Notice that the objectives and the decision variables are not standard-
ized, so that they may be measured in any appropriate unit. 
üJ2 
x, 
Fig. 1. Feasible solutions of a decisiottprablem when I=J=2. 
The set of feasible alternatives is denoted by K. The objectives as functions of 
the mstruments
 a r e depicted by the lines Ü>. and co . The extreme scenarios 
(situation a) are denoted by a and a^, the "public interest" compromise (situation b) 
is b, whereas c and c are the half-compromises between situation b on the one 
hand and situation a and a„ on the other. 
We shall now give a more precise definition of the various concepts 
illustrated in fig. 1. 
(a) Extreme alternatives can be obtained by solving the following mathematical 
programming problem for j=l,...,J. 
maxi oj. (x) 
subject to x € K 
(1) 
The consequences of the optimal solution x. for the various other objectives can be 
calculated by means of the J objective functions, giving rise to the vector 
CÜ (£.) • For each j, such a vector can be calculated. The pay-off matrix P of 
order JxJ which summarizes these extremes: 
* 
OJ (!T)] 
— —ü 
(2) 
2) 
provides a good picture of the conflicts involved in the decision problem. 
* 
Consider, for example, the diagonal elements of P. Let u denote this diagonal. 
. . . * ~~ 
By definition, then ID. is the highest attainable level for the j-th objective. 
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Hence, OJ is called the ideal solution. The measure of conflict between the objectives 
* * * * 
j and j' can be obtained by comparing the values to (x•,) and co. ; co. (x.,) - co 
is the loss for objective j when objective j' instead of j is maximized. 
* _ 
In addition to ^ , we can also derive from P a vector ^  with minimum 
attainable values for the J objectives, i.e. 
_ * 
co . = min co. (x.,) (3) 
* _ 
P, Ü) and _co are relevant pieces of information for the DM. They describe the 
consequences when a maximum value is pursued for only one objective, with a 
complete neglect of the other J-l objectives. 
(b) A necessary complement to the J extreme alternatives is the concept of a 
compromise decision. The concept of a compromise solution can be described in the 
following way. At least three reasonable requirements have to be met to 
characterize a solution as a compromise: 
1. A compromise solution should be based on the notion that the values of all J 
objectives are judged equally important in some sense. 
3) 
2. A compromise solution should not be dominated by another feasible solution. 
3. Extreme solutions such as the elements of P should not necessarily deserve more 
attention as a compromise solution than other intermediate solutions. 
We present three different compromise concepts, which satisfy the require-
ments of impartiality, efficiency and non-extremity. 
a 4) 
a. The solution x which dominates the greatest number of feasible solutions : 
/ j/~J ' 
:1 V ïï maxi II {Ü^CX) - co..} 
(4) 
j=l ^ 3 
s.t. x e K 
b. The solution x which has a minimum distance with respect to the ideal solution 
* 
^. The result is an additive rather than a multiplicative variant such as (4-): 
_ ^ , 
J /(JJ.-Ü).(JC) \ p 
M*1-^— " ,
 P > 1 
j = l\Cü.- CO. / 
1
 3
 (5) 
I s.t. x 6 K 
\ -
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When p=2, (5) passes into the minimization of the well-known Euclidean distance 
between w and w(x) (taking account of the differences in the dimensions of the 
— " _ * _ 
various objectives by introducing the denominator u.-w.). 
c. The solution x which is optimal for the compromise vector _X_: 
•r 
\ max! A.' cu(x) 
s.t. x e K 
(6) 
A possible way to find a compromise vector _A_ is to solve (cf. Fandel [1972]): 
P'A = c i 
i' X = 1 
(7) 
where i = (l,.^.,D' 
This implies: 
A = 
(p-r 1 ! 
i ' ( p ' ) - 1 i 
(8) 
According to this vector of weights, the J extreme solutions, summarized in P, 
are valued equally. Hence A satisfies the impartiality condition. 
Rietveld [1979] presents a survey of other potential candidates of compromise 
solutions, as well as a test whether the concepts satisfy the above mentioned 
requirements. The conclusion is that x and x are completely satisfactory, while 
G 3 1") C 
x is certainly acceptable when _A. ^_ 0_. As the outcomes for x , x. and JC are in 
general not identical, we may conclude that a compromise is not unique. Notice that 
any compromise concept presupposes. a certain weighing scheme. In fig. 2 the compromises 
have been illustrated graphically. 
Fig. 2. Compromise decisions in a decision problem with two objectives. 
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c a b Figure 2 shows that indeed the compromises w_ , u_ and CÜ , corresponding to _x , x 
c 
and x , are different. 
3- Half-compromises 
In section 2 we discussed J+l reasonable candidates for the information bundie 
to be produced by the analyst. There is an obvious reason why this packet is not 
yet complete: it contains too many extreme alternatives and too little intermediate 
ones. Consequently, the probability that the DM will find an appealing alternative 
is small. 
There are various ways to generate intermediate solutions. Two ways will be 
dealt with briefly here. The first one uses (6) as a starting-point. By varying 
repetitively and systematically the values of _X in (6), the analyst can produce 
a great number of intermediate solutions. The second method is based on side-
conditions,' rather than on weights and has b.een elaborated by Haimes et al [1975]. By 
solving 
maxI Ü) .(x) 
^ s.t. x € K (9) 
ÜJ > Ü) + e • 
for various j and for various values of £ >_ £, again a great number of non-extreme 
solutions can be obtained. By adding e to the programming model, the constraint set 
remains convex. 
A drawback of the methods may be that - especially for large values of J -
the number of alternatives generated is very large. Given the requirement that the 
DM should not be exposed to overwhelming amounts of information, a selection of the 
generated alternatives has to be made. To avoid the problems of too much information 
and of the selection, the concept of a half-compromise solution seems promising 
in this respect. It adds a very limited number, J, of alternatives to the existing 
J+l, each being in some sense located half way between the compromise solution 
and an extreme solution. 
Consider e.g. the compromise x . It is the solution of: 
-
 qi 
maxi v n (U.(X)-(Ü.) J 
s.t. x € K 
when the series of powers £ is equal to 
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Thus we may conclude that x is obtained when all powers q., in (4-') are equal 
* 3 
to 1 (j'=l,...,J), while x. can be found when q. = J, and q., = 0 (jT=l,..., 
j-1, j+1,...,J). 
A reasonable way to calculate a set of half-compromises is therefore to solve 
(4-') for a series of power vector s q.: 
3 
q. = i=- (i + J e.) j=l,...,J (10) 
•^ 3 2J - -2 
where s. is a J-vector with J-1 zero elements and an element 1 on the j-th position. 
^ b 
In a similar way a set of half-compromises can be derived from ÏC . We first 
generalize (5) by the introduction of weights q.: 
_ .' 
u . -u . (x) \ y 
* _ 
ÜJ.-Ü). / / : n 
Here we find again that the substitution of (10) in (5') yields a series of half-
fa * 
compromises, because x can be calculated for q=x_ and x. is obtained when 
q=J e .. 
- -3 
For a half compromise x a vector of half-compromise weights X_. is necessary. 
_X. can be obtained by generalizing (7) in the following way: 
P' X. = cq. 
-3 ^3 
i' A. = 1 
(7') 
so that 
(p')-V. 
X r ^ (8') 
3
 i»(P') X q. 
~ ^3 
Substitution of (8') in (6) yields the desired half-compromise. 
The series of importance indicators £. deserves some additional attention. 
(10) implies that objective j has a weight equal to (J+D/2J, whereas the other 
J-1 objectives have a weight 1/2J. Hence the ratio of the weight of objective j 
and the sum of the weights of the other objectives is equal to (J+1)/(J-1). In 
section 5 we will find that sometimes other ratios will be necessary. Therefore, 
we propose to generalize (10) in the following way: 
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^ T i T Ï T r ^ + ^ M (hi0) (10'} 
2=] (l+h)J — —3 — 
The pertaining ratio is now equal to (hJ+l)/(J-l). The halfcompromise, based on 
(10'), will be denoted by ÜK . 
The conclusion can be drawn that there are various ways to generate a limited 
number of non-extreme alternatives which give a reasonable survey of the conflicts 
involved. When the total number produced, 2J+1, is too small, another series of J 
alternatives can easily be produced by specifying another value for h. The half-
compromise concept also appears to be important for the determination of compromise 
ranges, discussed in section 5. 
4. Interactive Decision Methods to Select a Unique Alternative 
In the preceding sections we assumed a unidirectional way of information 
processing from the analyst to the DM. One can also imagine an active DM, however, 
who comments on the information produced and gives instruetions to look for mew 
alternatives in certain directions. Thus an interactive process may emerge in 
which the DM and the analyst exchange information about desirabilities and possi-
bilities. A considerable number of attempts has been made to devise a structure 
for this communication process. These structures share some common elements: 
(a) the analyst presents a provisional solution to the DM; 
tb) the DM expresses his opinion about this solution. Compromise solutions are 
reasonable candidates for such a provisional solution. 
Compromises based on distance metrics have been used by Benayoun et al. 
[1971], Fichefet [1974] and Nijkamp and Rietveld [1977]. Compromise weights have 
been applied by Fandel [1972], Monarchi et al. [1973], Nijkamp and Rietveld 
[1976 ] and Zionts and Wallenius [1976]. 
In addition to the provisional solution, a number of other possible and meaning-
ful solutions may be presented in order to provide a frame of reference for the DM. 
Most authors quoted above entploy the pay-off matrix. Zionts and Wallenius [1976] 
propose to calculate in the linear case all adjacent corner solutions. 
Regarding the reaction of the DM, most authors propose to ask him which of the 
objectives in the provisional solution is certainly unsatisfactory. In addition, 
the DM may want to specify minimum achievement levels for other objectives, 
indicating how far he allows reductions for these objectives in order to improve 
the unsatisfactory objectives. Monarchi et al. [1973] let the analyst ask the 
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DM to fix a desired value for a certain objective. Zionts and Wallenius [1976] 
advocate another approach. They do not want to compare the performance of each 
of the objectives of the provisional solution, but they want to compare the 
provisional solution with each of the adjacent corner solutions. For each solution 
the DM has to indicate whether he prefers it to the provisional solution or not. 
The answer of the DM can easily be integrated into mathematical programming 
models in the form of extra constraints, so that the next provisional solution 
may reflect the DM's preferences in a more satisfactory way. In some cases (e.g. 
Monarchi et al. [1973Dit may appear that the added constraints make the 
feasible area empty. Then the DM should be asked to revise his reaction. All 
methods share the property that they lead to a converging communication between 
analyst and DM. Difficulties may of course arise when a DM wants to abandon 
constraints, formulated in former steps. Then no convergence can be proved. 
All methods discussed above deal only with efficiënt points. Geoffrion et 
al. [1972] present a method in which the provisional solution is not necessarily 
efficiënt. They propose to ask the DM to express directly the provisional solution 
and the weights attached to the objectives. Here we find another difference, 
because the above mentioned methods only implicitly deal with weights. This is 
an advantage, because DM's appear to have great difficulties in specifying weights 
explicitly (cf. Wallenius [1975]). 
Af ter this general introduction, we now turn to a more detailed discussion 
of a certain interactive decision method. It consists of two stages: 
stage 1 The analyst solves J mathematical programming problems in order to 
* — o 
find P, Ü)_ and to. He calculates the compromise solution u_ by means of 
(6). This solution is presented to the DM. 
stage 2 The DM mentions the objectives with an unsatisfactory performance. 
If all objectives are satisfactory, the procedure can be finished. 
If all objectives are unsatisfactory, the problem does not lead to an 
acceptable solution. If only some objectives are unsatisfactory, the 
analyst has to add constraints to the mathematical program indicating 
that the performance of these objectives concerned should be improved. 
Then one should go back to stage 1. 
Of course, the improvement of the unsatisfactory objectives can only be realized 
at the cost of worse performances of some of the other objectives. 
Fandel [1972] shows that this kind of procedure leads to a converging process. 
An important question concerning this method is whether the DM has enough 
information to be able to express a. well-based opinion. Does he know the conse-
quences of the addition of constraints on the problem? It is worthwhile therefore 
to provide information about these consequences. 
Suppose, we want to know the effects of a constraint on the j-th objective 
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upon the remaining decision space in the following steps of the interaction. Then 
we can calculate the corresponding pay-off matrix P"1 by solving for j'=l,...,J: 
maxi ai., (x) 
/ s.t. x 6 K (11) 
CO. (x) > U>. 
1 - - 1 
*-i 1 
In a manner completely analogous to (2) and (3), ideal levels ^f as well as minimum 
attainable levels ar can be derived. Fig. 3 gives an illustration of these opera-
tions. Clearly, imposing the constraint UK >_ w., leads to a reduction of the 
2 
* 
ü)(x2) 
U) — 
> *2 * 
- i 
~ ^ ^ i 
> • * 
1 
l 
i * 1 
. | i ö 
0 «"N. 
u> 1 \ 
~ i \ 
t 
1 
! 
1 
1 
1, 
i 
1 
X. i 
..-> 
_1 * U> 
Fig. 3 
CO ÏÏ^Sl) 
Shifting ideal solutions for J=2 
Ml 
* 1 
maximum attainable value of u in ar . A similar statement holds true for a 
constraint on u>0. Thus the effects of the constraint co. > ui. on the ideal solution 
2
 3 - 3 
can be calculated beforehand. 
Fig. 3 gives rise to another observation. When the number of objectives ia 2, 
the decision problem has a dichotomous character: departing from os, one may choose 
between two mutually exclusive options: an improvement of ui or of ui,.. When J>3, 
this dichotony is less clear, which is illustrated by fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. The effects of imposing restrictions on the set of feasible solutions. 
Suppose that the solutxon which will be ultimately chosen is an element of'A. 
Then the DM can give 2 answers when he is asked which objective in a_ is to be 
improved, viz. ÜI or co . Since an improvement of w does not necessarily imply 
a worse value of to-, the dichotomy no longer prevails. This does not hold true 
for B, however. If the ultimate solution is in B, the only way to express priorities 
in a consistent way is: Ü) >_ ÜK , because in B w is improved a.t the expense of 
tü and CÜ„. 
5. An Interactive Deeision Method to Select a Range of Alternatives 
The interactive methods, discussed in section M-,share the property that a 
unique alternative can be selected, if at least the DM and the analyst obey 
the communication rules. In certain situations, however, the determination 
of a whole range of alternatives instead of only one seems to be more appropriate. 
We will give some examples: 
(a) When a deeision.problem is very complicated, it may be worthwhile • to use a 
"mixed scanning" approach (cf Faludi [1973]). Then first a set of promising 
alternatives is selected, based on a limited amount of Information. Only in the 
second stage the final deeision is selected from this set, based on all available 
information. 
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(b) A politician who has to take a decision needs a certain space for bargaining 
with the various groups concerned. It will be wise for him to reserve some 
options. 
In (a) and (b) it is undesirable to select a unique alternative. In the next 
examples it is even impossible: 
(c) The objectives involved in the problem may be so diverse, that the DM is 
unable to rank or specify his priorities in the course of the interaction. 
(d) In many situations decision-making bodies consist of more than one person. 
It is exceptional that they would fully agree on the alternative to be chosen. 
In many cases one may expect, however, that they agree to a certain extent on 
the undesirability of some alternatives. It is possible then to start the 
collective decision procedure with the elimination of irrelevant alternatives. 
In a second stage complementary selection methods have to be used, such as 
bargaining or voting. 
It should be noted that the determination of a range R of alternatives is 
not less time-consuming than the selection of a unique alternative, as in the 
former case the problem arises how to find the boundaries of a set of solutions, 
satisfying a constraint such as f(w , ...,wT) > 0. We propose therefore to 
approximate R by means of a set Q of feasible solutions such that 
Q = {x € K | w(>c) ü u. }5 while R c: Q. Thus we may conclude: 
R C Q C K (12) 
The problem of finding R is thus transformed into the problem of determining <j*_ in 
such a way that (12) is satisfied and Q ^  (Q <= R) is as small as possible. 
We propose to determine Q in two phases: 
a) Proceed with the interactive procedure described in section 4 until a compro-
mise solution is found which is an element of the range R. The vector (Ü, derived 
from the pay-off matrix P may serve as a first approximation of io 
b) A further refinement of co can be obtained by an interactive analysis of 
the desirability of half-compromises and extreme solutions. 
In fig. 5 the interactive method is described in more detail. 
Fig. 6 gives a graphical illustration of the procedures involved. Let R be the 
yet unknown range and u_ the corresponding vector of minimum achievement levels. 
The first compromise solution C is outside the range. Hence a constraint on CJ„ is 
added. In the second step the compromise D is in R. Consequently, we turn to the 
second phase of the procedure: the evaluation of the elements of the pay-off matrix 
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analyst: 
given: co (x) , K 
>/ 
calculate: P, ÜJ_, 
ask: is u^  in the 
* O 
ül, ül 
range? 
answer: no 
analyst 
analyst 
DM 
analyst 
o . ask: which objective in _ui is the 
least satisfactory solution? 
answer: nr j 
add constraint: ui.(x) > ui. 
3 - - 3 
SL 
specify: h 
ask: which alternative in P is the 
least satisfactory solution? 
analyst calculate: half-compromise tü 
ask: is u. in the range? 
. ~2 
the alternatives in P are not very 
far from being satisfactory 
DM answer: yes 
*/ 
analyst doublé h 
DM answer: no 
(STOP J 
4/ 
analyst ask: which 
least 
objective in u. is the 
satisfactory solution? 
V 
DM answer: nr k 
analyst 
Jl 
add constraint: ui, (x) > ui.. k — — ik 
*— * 
calculate: P, ui, ui 
Fig. 5 Flow chart for the interactive decision procedure to determine 
a range of potential alternatives. 
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üi2 
Fig. 6. The range-aiming Interactive procedure illustrated 
B and C. Because B is the least satifactory solution, the half-compromise co 
is calculated (E), which-is still unsatisfactory. Hence another constraint is 
added. The new P matrix consists of the alternatives E and C. E is less satis-
factory than C. Again a half-compromise co is calculated (F), which falls inside 
the range. After a redoubling procedure we find the alternative G, which falls 
outside the range. Note that in a limited number of steps the minimum levels u^  
have risen from M1 to Il , which is already relatively close to u_ mm 
Three aspects of the procedure will be dealt with briefly a) the deter-
mination of a, b) the stop criterion, and c) the possibility to determine a 
unique alternative when there are several DM's. 
a) The appropriate value of a depends inter alia on the number of steps which has 
already been passed through in the procedure. When a is held constant during the 
procedure, the probability rises that a half-compromise is in the range R. As the 
procedure is most rapid, when co. is just outside R, it is better to increase a 
continuously. 
b) As to the stop-criterion, it is good to note that R is actually a fuzzy 
set (cf. Zadeh [1965], Blin [1977]). There will be many doubtful cases whether or 
not an alternative is an element of R. It is therefore reasonable to restrict Q not 
top far, because otherwise satisfactory elements could be wrongly excluded from R. 
c) At least three ways can be used to determine a unique alternative from R 
when there are various DM's. 
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1) Generate a number of efficiënt alternatives from R by means of the methods 
described in section 2 and 3. The DM's select one solution after a voting 
or bargaining procedure. 
2) Use the interactive procedure with each single DM. Thus each DM reveals his 
preferences. Then the analyst can generate a final compromise solution by givin 
each DM an equal weight in the decision criterion. 
3) Use the following collective interactive procedure: after the derivation of R, 
the analyst generates a provisional solution w_. Each DM (n=l,...,N) assigns 
weights y =(p, , ...,uT )'to the J elements of £ indicating the need to improve 
ÜJIS...,Ü)T. The sum of the weights is restricted to, say, one. Then the 
J
 1 _ 
collective weights are: v = — E u . Let v denote a diagonal matrix with v as 
— N n —n — 
elements on the main diagonal. Then a new provisional solution can be generated 
under the new constraints: 
w > v S + (I-v) üï (13) 
The next section is devoted to some numerical examples. 
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6. Numerical Application to the Costs of Mobility 
Some of the concepts and methods developed above will be applied to a 
physical planning problem concerning the costs of mobility. Given the expansion 
of employment in a region, the problem studied is the determination of the 
location pattern for employees migrating into the region to ensure minimal costs 
for home-to-work trips. Three kinds of costs have been distinguished (j=l,2,3 ): 
(1) total private transport cost (measured in units of money) 
(2) total damage to the urban environment (measured in units of urban environ-
mental quality) 
(3) total damage to the natural environment (measured in units of natural 
environmental quality) 
This model will be applied to a hypothetical closed region with 6 different 
locations (k=l,„<><,,6) and 2modes of transport, namely car and train (m=l,2). 
Some locations are directly connected. The set S with elements (k,i) indicates 
the pairs of locations between which a direct connection exists with respect to 
transport mode m. The costs (category j) of transport by means of mode m between 
the directly connected locations k and 1 for one person will be denoted by 
CL 't. . Let x, , denote the number of persons travelling by mode m from k to L 
For the general case with J cost categories and M modes of transport, the 
objectives of the programming problem are: 
(HO 
m 1 m 
mini i a . - Z Z c, »_ x, •-
1
 m k,l€Sm ^ ^' X 
• t r, r, m,J m mini CÜT= Z Z c, ', x, -
J
 m k,iesm ^ ^ > x 
There are several constraints to this problem 
(1) constraints on the capacity of links: 
x£
 x < x^ x Vta, V(k,l)esm (15) 
(2) constraints on the space for dwellings in the various locations. Let u 
denote the number of employees located in place n and u the maximum number 
which could be located, then 
u < u Vn 
n - n 
(16) 
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(3) Let v denote the number of job vacancies in n, then an equilibrium on 
n 
the labour market implies that excess demand for labour in n is equal to 
the net inflow of employees: 
u - v = Z 2
 m xIV - S 2 x™ Vn 
n n
 m k , n € S m ^ > n m k , n € S m n > k 
(17) 
(<+) non-negativity constraints: 
m 
Vi* > o Vm, (k,l) S 
m (18) 
u , v > 0 
n n -
Vn 
We now turn to the description of the data of the transportation network„ 
The network has been visualized in Fig„ 7. 
connection by car 
Ijl | j |l)l 11 connection by train 
4- -capacity constraint 
^ 
valuable natural 
environment 
vulnerable urban 
environment 
Fig. 7. The transportation network 
The network consists of 6 modes, 9 connections by car and 2 by train, For 
two connections capacity constraints have been specified. The situation on the 
labour market is described in Table 1. 
location n 1 2 3 4 5 6 
maximum number of dwellings u 
• 
5,000 3,000 10,000 15,000 50,000 17,000 
number of vacancies v 
n 
1,500 2,500 5,000 20,000 65,000 5,000 
Table 1. Data about dwellings and demand of labour. 
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•The costs of mobility can be found in Table 2 for both modes of transport. 
In addition to this, Table 2 presents the capacity constraints Je™ mentioned before. 
mode (m) 1 2 
traject (k,l) (1,4)(1,6)(2,3)<2,4)(3,4)(3,5)(4,5)(4,6)(5,6)(4,5)(4,5) 
cm'3 1) k,l i ; 
x, . (number of 
' persons) 
23 14 16 30 18 34 25 21 30 
10 9.-5 .9 11 14 18 14 16 
20 15 10 13 12 35 8 9 40 
- - - - - 7,000 - 10,000 
27 24 
7 6 
3 3 
14,000 
1) measured in the units mentioned above 
Table 2. Transportation costs per person and capacity constraints. 
type of defined in 
solution equation 
Wl W2 <ü3 
measured in thousands of 
the appropriate units 
1 1 1 1 1 
Xl,4 X2,4 X3,4 X3,5 X4,5 X 
measured in num 
ïï2 ( 1 ) 
^3 (1) 
S (5) 
8* (h=l) (5') 
S* (h=l) (5') 
8* (h=l) (5') 
629„0 336.0 584.0 
716.5 253.5 433.5 
S26.5 395.5 265.5 
713.0 254,0 437.0 
§50,0 263,0 539.0 
716.5 253,5 433.5 
776.5 305.5 345.5 
3000 — • -- 5000 3000 
2500 500 — 5000 --
2500 500 5000 — 10000 3 
3000 — — 5000 — 
3000 ~ — 5000 --
2500 500 — 5000 — 
2500 500 -- 5000 — 8 
Table 3. A number of representative solutions to the decision problem. 
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It has been assumed that the connections are symmetrie, so that: 
m,j m,j 
<t m=(l,2) V(k,l)esm j=l,2,3) (19) 
-m _ -m 
For only two connections by car, capacity constraints have been included into 
the model. 
The capacity constraint on transport by train means that only lH-,000 persons can 
travel by train from a certain location to a subsequent one during their trip 
from home to work. This completes the description of the structure of the decision 
problem. 
In Table 3 some of the concepts developed have been illustrated, the first 
three rows constitute the pay-off matrix P' with extreme options. We find that 
different evaluations of the various costs of mobility give rise to considerable 
different optimal patterns of commuting. The last two columns of Table 3 indicate 
that the evaluation of the mobility costs also influences the determination of the 
optimal location pattern. The next row indicates the compromise solution
 w , 
calculated for p=l. The last three rows of Table 3 are the half compromises, 
discussed in section 3. Owing to the special form of decision problem (it is 
^ oh linear), we find that u„ and u_ are identical. In a model of a more general form, 
such an accidence is improbable. 
In Table 4 two steps of the interactive procedure have been illustrated. 
* 
The results of the first step are: a series of ideal levels to , a series of least 
attractive levels w and a series of compromise levels w . For each of the elements 
of the compromise u , the consequences have been pointed out when this element 
would be judged by the DM to be the most unsatisfactory one. Indeed, we find in 
each case a considerable reduction of the set of feasible solutions: the ideal 
* 
values Ü) are less attractive than the original ones, while the least attractive 
levels (£ have been improved to a certain extent. Note that the results of the 
three answers concerning the attractiveness of S in Table 4 indicate a strong 
conflict betweenü). and u . 
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s t e p type of soiution u l C O -2 
C ü _ 3 
1 * ÜJ 629.G 253.5 265.5 
ü) 826.5 395.5 584.0 
o 
CO 713.0 254.0 437.0 
2 
* 
CO 629.0 254.0 426.0 
t 1 * ü>j_ .5 ü>[/ (0 713.0 336.0 584.0 
2 
* 
CO 713.0 253.5 432.7 
( i f uu 5 ^o^ CO 717 .1 254.0 439.2 
2 
* 
co 706.2 253.5 265.5 
( i f ai ^üi,) 
CO 826.5 395.5 437.0 
Table 4. Steps of the interactive procedure. 
It appears to be impossible to find a feasible soiution for which the objectives 
co- and Ü>2 in co can be improved. For the other pairs of objectives, this dichotomy 
does not arise. 
/ In each step, the DM's indication of the most undesirable objective will 
lead to a further reduction of the set of feasible alternatives. Thus finally a 
unique soiution or a range of desirable alternatives will be found. 
7. Conclusion. 
Two ideal types of decision making in physical planning can be distinguished. 
In the first one it is the analyst who has to determine the most attractive 
alternative after a careful analysis of pros and cons. An example of this type is 
cost-benefit-analysis. In the second type the political character of decisions is 
stressed. Hence it is the politician who has to determine which alternatives have 
to be analysed and which one will be selected. In this study we tried to integrate 
the positive points of both types. Therefore, a number of concepts and methods 
has been developed to enable a fruitful cooperation between the analyst with his 
intellectual capacity and the politician with his decision taking capacity. 
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Notes 
1) See for an interesting discussion of well-defined and ill-defined problems: 
Rittel and Webber [1973] and Gillingwater [1975]. 
2) The concept of the pay-off matrix has been introduced in multiple objective 
decision theory among others by Benayoun et al. [1970, 1971] and 
Belenson and Kapur [1973]. 
3) See for an exact definition of an efficiënt, non-dominated or Pareto-optimal 
solution: Geoffrion [1968]. 
M-) s.t. denotes "subject to". 
c 
5) Another way of deriving a half-compromise similar to x can be found by 
introducing a half-comproniise pay-off matrix P.: 
P. - (uCx^),... ^ Cx.--^ JÜ(X, ) »ü(x-+1) J • • • >ü(iSj)) 
After substitution of P. in (8) the desired result can be obtained by 
3 
solving (6). 
6) There appears to be a certain similarity between the concept of a range 
of potential solutions developed here, and the concept of a confidence 
interval in econometrics (cf. Johnston [1972]). 
Assume e.g. a linear utilityfunction U = 2i'üL» where H s a stochastic 
variable which has a normal distribution with mean X_ and a covariance 
matrix Ü. Let S be a set of combinations of weights, which is synHaetric 
0 £ 
around X, , such that Pr [_X £ S ]=e - Then the range of potential solutions can 
be defined as follows: 
R = { u 3 a certain value of X £ S such that'u is the optimal solution 
corresponding to this value of X }. 
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